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Missile Sub Plans Scrapped:

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WASHINGTON, June 15 — President Nixon considered starting a crash program of missile submarine construction to satisfy his military advisers' misgivings about a Soviet-United States offensive missile freeze some months ago, but then gave it up on their advice.

This, as well as other revelations about why U. S. hopes were dashed for a more comprehensive nuclear arms accord and limitations on multiple independently targeted warheads [MIRV], came out of White House adviser Henry Kissinger's briefing of key congressmen today.

After general agreement was reached last year to include intercontinental ballistic missiles in an offensive weapons freeze, Kissinger said, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that unless submarine missiles were included they could not support the freeze.

Since the only alternative was a crash submarine building program, the President explored it with them, but it was determined that no submarine could be ready before 1976, and even then, it would have lacked refinements needed in the 1980s.

It was against this deadlock that Nixon went directly to the Soviet leadership, for the second time since the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] started late in 1969, and insisted upon inclusion of submarines in the freeze.

They agreed, Kissinger said, last April, less than a month before the Moscow Summit and only after long hesitation.

The first direct contact Nixon initiated resulted in agreement to include an offensive weapons accord at a time when the Soviets were more interested

in limiting defensive systems and the U. S. considered offensive ones most threatening.

Kissinger said preparation for SALT began with creation of a verification panel he chaired, and composed of officials from the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Their task was to study weapons systems and verification methods to determine in advance responses to various

changes in the arms balance, while maintaining momentum in the negotiations.

In late 1969, both sides agreed on basic strategic principles, and by mid-1970, put forward some concrete proposals with the hope of reaching a comprehensive agreement.

This failed, Kissinger confirmed, because of the Soviet definition of "strategic," which would have included U. S. aircraft based in Europe and on aircraft carriers, but excluding Soviet medium-range missiles aimed at Europe.

Likewise, the U. S. proposed a ban on testing MIRVs verified by national means and on deployment of MIRVs verified by on-site checks, believing the ban on testing more crucial than that on deployment.

Reject Test Ban

But the Soviets rejected the MIRV test ban, proposing instead an unverifiable ban on MIRV production which the U. S. rejected as an insufficient control.

By early 1971, with the Soviets insisting that agreement on offensive weapons be laid aside in favor of agreement on defensive ones only, Nixon initiated the first contact with Soviet leaders which eventually produced the agreement announced by a less-formal offensive arms agreement. Then, only two

the number of ABMS and which offensive weapons would be in-

Kissinger

cluded.

A U. S. proposal to keep the ABM sites existing and under construction—two at U. S. ICBM sites and one around Moscow—was rejected, and the present formula of one at each capital and one at an ICBM site was offered after the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided they preferred protection of the capital to a second ICBM site.